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is needed, not only to ground the discussion in practical reality, but also to place into context the development of unrealistic public expectations -expectations that work against airpower's ability to achieve political aims. This paper examines the manner in which civilian casualty avoidance has affected airpower's effectiveness in achieving policy objectives in Afghanistan today, and how atrophy in strategic communications has failed to create realistic public expectations. The author identifies four areas where a change in perspective of how airpower is viewed would be beneficial: the execution of airpower, the perspective of scholars, terminology used by airpower advocates, and the United States' approach to strategic communication. Changing mindsets is these areas will help create realistic expectations and improve the overall effectiveness of airpower; while preserving the military's quest for perfection and meeting the American desire for moral exceptionalism in warfare.
The Problem with "Precision": Managing Expectations for Air Power
I received a call from one of my Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC). He was excited. Not because he had dropped his first bomb in combat or because he had successfully prosecuted a high value target, but because he hadn't. He exclaimed, "Ma'am you'd be proud of me!" and proceeded to tell me how he and the ground force commander had an enemy insurgent in their sights and how the unmanned aerial vehicle overhead had contributed to the positive identification (PID) of one of the region's IED (improvised explosive device) emplacers. This particular individual had been farming the roads of the region daily in the hopes of a successful attack on coalition forces. However, instead of being permanently removed from the battlefield, this insurgent would live to fight another day because the JTAC advised the ground commander against a strike due to the likelihood of causing civilian casualties. The ground commander agreed and simply stated, "let him go." Though both the ground force commander and the JTAC regretted allowing an enemy combatant to continue to threaten both the people in the nearby village and coalition forces, they knew this was the right decision. They understood that it is often far better to allow the enemy to walk away than to chance possible harm to those they are charged to protect; even if it means placing friendly forces at increased risk by doing so. The JTAC did this proudly knowing that professionalism in warfare is difficult, but paramount. Proudly, because he not only understood the tactical perspective of airpower employment, but the strategic significance that misapplication of that power could produce. This is the mindset of our warfighters in Afghanistan today. A mindset that makes the battlehardened warrior proud of withholding lethal effects when warranted. The mindset that allows the ground force commander to say "let him go." Airmen employ meticulous measures in order to avoid civilian casualties when making the decision to apply airpower. These efforts need to be carefully considered by authors who address the issue of civilian casualties. The Airman's perspective is even more crucial when one considers all the authors noted above utilized specific technical aviation terms as part of the foundation upon which they built their conclusions. An
Airmen's perspective is required to explain the operational realities that exist in today's use of airpower, especially as it applies to mitigating civilian casualties.
The following analysis will offer one aviator's perspective on the discussion. The author will explore five areas: 1) the history and rhetoric that have shaped public expectation regarding civilian casualties, 2) the technological capabilities and terminology of precision bombing from an aviator's perspective, 3) the gap between the military and public understanding of airpower capabilities which has led to an overestimation of "precision bombing," 4) the military approach to mitigating aviationrelated civilian casualties in Afghanistan, and 5) the history of strategic communications and its atrophy which has resulted in a failure to manage expectations for the application of airpower. Finally, the author will examine the mindset of Airmen in Afghanistan today, and recommend three additional areas in which a change in perspective could facilitate the application of airpower in future conflicts.
Evolution of Perceptions
Since the beginning of aviation, aviators have been attempting to describe the ethereal nature of the air domain. Wilbur Wright was perhaps the first to attempt to put into words the emotion that is inspired by manned flight when he stated, "more than anything else, the sensation is one of perfect peace mingled with an excitement that strains every nerve to the utmost, if you can conceive of such a combination. Lindbergh. The media coverage of their exploits was similar to that of Hollywood stars, making them larger than life to the general public. One could sense and admire the overwhelming optimism with which these aviators tackled life. Their words not only inspired dreams, but set a stage for an even greater journey yet to come. One such example is Earhart's famous "paper tigers" speech, in which she described her motivation for her various exploits:
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The most difficult thing is the decision to act, the rest is merely tenacity. The fears are paper tigers. You can do anything you decide to do. You can act to change and control your life; and the procedure, the process is its own reward. 9 This kind of passion, entwined with the bravado of accomplishing something that once was deemed impossible, forged the indelible image of the aviator in the public mind. It is not surprising that the leading airpower advocates were caught up in this public excitement for early aviation and conveyed a similar passion, optimism, and bravado.
These emotions set the tone for future airpower advocates and created a tendency towards hyperbole, which has had a long-term effect on the general public's understanding of airpower, and expectations for its capabilities.
Guilo Douhet, one of the earliest airpower theorists, exhibited a passion which can be compared to that of a prophet. He believed so devoutly that airpower not only would revolutionize warfare but, if properly applied, it would be the basis upon which victory would be achieved. In his book Command of the Air, Douhet prophesized that airpower would "completely upset all forms of war so far known." 10 In his mind, airpower's invincibility was a foregone conclusion: "Nothing man can do on the surface of the earth can interfere with a plane in flight, moving freely in the third dimension."
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Nations that did not pursue airpower risked failure in future conflicts as "an adequate national defense cannot be assured except by an aerial force." This was, of course, written before the advent of anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles. One wonders whether Douhet, had he known of such inventions, would have changed his basic tenet, "To conquer the command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemy may please to impose." 12 It is doubtful.
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Another such acolyte of the skies was William "Billy" Mitchell. In his book The Icarus Syndrome, Carl Builder wrote that Mitchell "went well beyond the theoretical preaching of Douhet;" instead, he became more of a public advocate or publicist for airpower. 13 Mitchell created a divide between those in the know, the Airmen, and the mere mortals who were doomed to walk the earth on two legs, "Few outside of the air fraternity itself know or understand the dangers these men face." 14 His persona only added to the audacity. Historian Roger Miller wrote of Mitchell, "His often irreverent, colorful statements made him popular with the press, who found him 'good copy'." 15 Mitchell expertly captured the daring and boldness of the early airmen -men who believed that the air domain must be experienced in order to be truly understood. bombs could destroy a target. The accuracy had nearly tripled with an average CEP of 1,000 feet (308 meters), but the public's expectations still outran operational capability by a wide margin. 34 American media coverage depicted the "mass nature" of the air campaign through footage issued by the Department of Defense, depicting the resulting fires and explosions; however, the reality of the destruction was 'balanced' with the fact that "civilians had received ample warning on the bombing." 35 The Vietnam conflict saw the early transition from World War II era bombing to the early ancestor of today's precision-guided munitions (PGMs), the laser-guided bomb (LGB). According to Paul Gillespie, the effort to destroy the Thang Hoa bridge epitomized the start of this transition.
The bridge was first attacked by seventy-nine F-105 fighter-bombers on April 3, 1965. Despite dropping 638 750-pound bombs, firing three hundred rockets and missiles, and losing five aircraft in the process, the bridge, though hit several times, remained intact. Seven years and 869 sorties later, traffic was still crossing Thanh Hoa unimpeded. 
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By 1990, the start of the Gulf War, "the capabilities of smart airplanes dropping dumb bombs" could place an unguided munition within 30 feet (9 meters) of the intended point of impact. 39 Even so, the first three weeks of the war did not produce the desired attrition rates against Iraq's 4,000 tanks and nearly 3,000 armored personnel carriers, so war planners invoked the technology of precision-guided munitions from F-111 aircraft with resounding success. The F-111s ended the war with "664 successful antitank missions, destroying 1,500 tanks, mechanized vehicles, and artillery pieces." 40 
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A flight of four modern day fighters could destroy one target, which required over 3,000 bomber aircraft in World War II.
The results became even more impressive towards the end of the Gulf War when precision munitions were employed from one stealth fighter/bomber with the capability to destroy two targets within 10 feet (3 meters) accuracy. 41 The television footage of precision guided bombs "going through a ventilation shaft in an Iraqi office building" left an undeniable public impression of perfection. 42 F-117 stealth fighters were able to strike "sector operations centers, intercept operations centers, key command centers, and key communications nodes," with accuracy unrivaled in previous conflicts.
In Afghanistan, that same level of accuracy is now common to all aircraft employing precision-guided munitions. While the specifics of aircraft to target ratios and CEP are classified, the fact remains that Coalition Forces are doing more with one
Unmanned Aerial System and a single Hellfire missile than several bomber squadrons could have hoped to achieve in World War II. Given the copious literature extolling the accuracy and remarkable technological advances of airpower, it is easy to fall into the layman's trap of equating precision with perfection. In order to avoid this pitfall and to fully understand the reality of airpower capabilities, it is necessary to define the key terms as they are understood and used by a professional combat aviator.
Precision Defined
As aviation developed and the overestimation of airpower capabilities grew, so did the confusion about the way to understand civilian casualties in war. Norms of international justice demand discrimination. The problem is that operational realities limit what is possible in wartime scenarios. There are five terms regarding weapons effects, that must be understood in order to fully comprehend the process Airmen apply when prosecuting targets and striving to avoid civilian casualties. These are precision bombing, precision-guided munition, circular error probable, collateral damage, and risk estimate distance. The Department of Defense defines these terms in the Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Aviators, airpower experts and authors alike have utilized these definitions but through a slightly different lens.
Precision bombing is defined by the United States military as "bombing directed at a specific target." 46 From the aviator's perspective, the term "precision" does not imply, as one might assume, accuracy. Instead, the word precision exclusively pertains to a discriminate targeting process. By using a word that has such specific meaning in the mind of most civilians, it is easy to see how a gap in understanding and expectations has been fostered. However, the concept of accuracy does come into play when defining Precision-guided munitions (PGM). A PGM is "a guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage." 47 The military sees a PGM as a type of guided weapon, while the public tends to focus their comprehension of this term on the word precision. The confusion is compounded when one attempts to understand the concept of minimizing collateral damage. In order to accomplish this task, the terms circular error probable, collateral damage, and risk estimate distance must be introduced.
Circular error probable (or CEP) is "an indicator of the delivery accuracy of a weapon system, used as a factor in determining probable damage to a target. It is the radius of a circle within which half of a missile's projectiles fall." 48 Together these terms define a circular radius in which Airmen must consider the possibility of unintended consequence…consequences to both civilians in the area, as 13 well as friendly forces. Understanding these terms allow combat aviators to apply both the concept of risk estimate distance, which is used to "estimate the danger to friendly troops," and collateral damage estimate in order to protect friendly forces and civilians while destroying the intended target. 51 The aviator applies this skill set and knowledge in the fluid combat environment through split-second decision-making based upon imperfect information. One example of the combat application of these concepts was provided by an F-15E aircrew.
We were a flight of two [F-15s], tasked for close air support to friendly forces patrolling near several small villages. The terrain was fairly typical for Afghanistan, small enclaves of houses separated by fields. We received a radio call from the JTAC saying an insurgent had just launched an RPG [rocket propelled grenade] at the patrol and had hit one of the vehicles. We were immediately able to identify the insurgent, who was running across the field towards the two villages away from the friendly forces. The JTAC quickly confirmed he had maintained visual contact with the insurgent and that we had the proper target. We then began coordinating for an attack. Given the time it takes to reposition the aircraft for an attack run, it became apparent that the insurgent would be between the two villages by time we were able to employ. So we rapidly conducted a collateral damage estimate and calculated the risk estimate distance. In doing so we determined a GBU-54, a Joint Direct Attack Munition, [a type of PGM] with a 5-millisecond delay on the fuse would not only satisfy the target, but would also adhere to the ROE. Mitigating the risk of civilian casualties was the most important factor in making that determination. The JTAC and ground commander approved our weapon recommendation and cleared us "hot"…the weapon worked as advertised. The insurgent died, and there was only a divot in the field between the villages. Not one of the nearby houses was harmed. The entire engagement took less than five minutes. targets, but his commanders elected restraint. 56 According to historian Conrad Crane, the subordinate commanders' decision added emphasis to the increasing demand for accuracy in bombing operations in urban areas. 57 Like the Korean War, the Vietnam conflict increased the demand for accuracy and precision in airpower employment. In the early 1970s, the American public became increasingly insistent that military leadership "limit collateral damage and noncombatant casualties." 58 The advent of laser-guided bombs gave both the military and the public the precision they were seeking, and Operation Linebacker I proved airpower's ability to meet the increased demands for accuracy. From April to May 1972, more than 70-percent of the enemy tanks destroyed or damaged were the result of these "new 'aerial-precision' attacks."
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In 1991, Operation Desert Storm "showed how radically precision attack had transformed the traditional notion" of war. 60 Civilian audiences had front row seats to this transformation, as opening night footage of cruise missiles and anti-aircraft artillery fire streaming across television screens. The monochromatic weapon system video came to epitomize accuracy and precision, further persuading the public that modern warfare could be leveraged with 'silver bullets' that would never miss and only kill the bad guys. This demonstration of superior technology fueled the idea that wars could be prosecuted without casualties. The television footage aired during the 90-day Air War over Serbia helped cement the image of aviation excellence and precision in the minds of viewers worldwide, with bomb after bomb impacting precisely where the weapon system was designated. A perception that held, despite the fact that erroneous targeting led to the destruction of the Chinese embassy.
Precision = Perfection: Zero Margin of Error
Weapon system footage and the ongoing rhetoric of airpower advocates has anchored expectations for airpower to deliver in their quest for precision. And therefore, the Air Force has reaped what it has sown in the resulting public expectation for perfection. The employment of such precision "technologically, culturally, and morally represented a new American way of war." 61 While the public expects perfection, the world of aviation creates an insatiable demand for it, as even a minor mistake can lead to loss of life. This never-ending quest for flawlessness is bred into aviators from the first day of pilot training; it is reinforced after every combat mission, and it is even emphasized after an aviator's "fini-flight" (last flight), by way of the debrief. In debrief, no mistake is too small to identify and correct, no error is accepted without understanding its cause and determining how to fix it or avoid it in the future. Aviators learn to live comfortably with the goal of perfection, while knowing it will never be attained. Perhaps this is why aviators use terms like "precision" and "surgical" so freely;
to them it is a desired end state, not necessarily a current reality. This culture of zero margin for error may also be the reason that the military has been unable to manage public expectations with regard to airpower employment and the potential for civilian casualties. His carefully crafted guidance spoke of four basic tenets which must influence every warfighter's decision to employ lethal force: great discipline, tactical patience, judicious application of force, and the inherent right to self-defense which must be applied in concert with the first three principles. 70 The commander's intent is to achieve perfection 19 with regard to eliminating "ISAF-caused civilian casualties across Afghanistan"…again, no margin for error. International Security Assistance Forces Joint Command, argued that the role of leadership in civilian casualty mitigation is that of influencing the warfighter's mindset. 73 Brigadier General Thomas Deale, 455th Air Expeditionary Wing Commander, summarized the shift in the aviator mindset in Afghanistan when he stated that the need to change was at the most basic level of how the Coalition is tactically employing airpower assets: "we train to get bombs off the aircraft, we don't train not to drop." 74 The challenge facing today's combat aviators is how to balance the avoidance of civilian casualties against the inherent right of self defense. "Self defense" is applied in broad terms as Airmen not only defend themselves, but also hold the responsibility to defend all friendly forces. In each case, the decision to act must be weighed with the potential long-term impact of civilian casualties. The Coalition has developed a complex series of Rules of Engagement, which are based in the rule of law, as well as the formal laws of armed conflict as codified in international documents and upheld in customary international law, which Airmen use during the targeting process. According to the senior legal counsel to the Combined Air Operations Center, these rules, while much debated, have "proven to be sufficient" in striking the balance between freedom of movement and civilian casualty avoidance. 75 In his closing remarks to the conference,
General Deale conveyed what is occurring on the battlefield today, "We must keep 20 everything in context…our forces and the air/ground teams are doing it right." 76 Major
General Tod Wolters, Commander, 9 th Air and Space Expeditionary Task ForceAfghanistan, equated the mindset shift to "PhD-level activity," and that activity is an ongoing evolution at all levels. 77 With such intensity being applied to mitigation, why does each occurrence of aviation-related civilian casualties still possess the ability to have a significant strategic impact?
Managing Expectations
In an August 2011 study of Afghan war casualties, Shanthie Mariet D'Souza proclaimed that "Violence against civilians has reached a record high in Afghanistan," but qualified her statement by explaining that the violence was due to insurgent activities, not coalition forces. 78 widely-held expectation because the United States has failed to take a proactive approach in managing these expectations when it comes to the application of airpower.
In fact, the rhetoric and weapons system footage used by advocates to extol the virtues of airpower has helped to solidify these expectations. In Information Operations
Matters, Leigh Armistead observed, "information campaigns are almost always conducted at a tactical level." 83 In the case of aviation-related civilian casualties, not only is information provided from the tactical perspective, but it is reactionary, rather than proactive. Public Affairs officers in Afghanistan confirmed the presence of a reactive communication plan with regard to civilian casualties, but "did not know of any pre-planned, or proactive plans." 84 Why is there a tension between the effort of eliminating the occurrence of aviation-related civilian casualties, and the effort to develop and apply a strategic communications plan to mitigate the impact civilian casualties have when they do occur? The simple answer, and perhaps one derived from the historical approach that airpower advocates have taken, is that no one really wants to admit that civilian casualties are possible. As one State Department employee put it, "taking a proactive approach would be admitting that civilian casualties could actually occur." 85 However, a complex, but more substantial, explanation is that airpower advocates are caught in a dilemma between a strong desire to demonstrate the effectiveness of airpower, and the need to manage expectations. If the past is any indicator of the future, even if advocates tone down the rhetoric of "precision," people have been conditioned to hear only what they want to hear…that which supports their "ideas of exceptionalism." 86 The
Department of Defense and defense contractors are the logical origin of this "precision" thought process; after all, Congress cannot be expected to authorize funding for research and development for "slightly-more-precise" weaponry. This 'marketing campaign' approach to aerial weaponry successfully feeds on the public desire to uphold this "sense of American exceptionalism" where warfare intersects human rights. Information in order to influence America's public opinion on the World War. 88 The organization used films, newspapers, radio, telegraph, and posters to encourage public support for the American war effort. This comprehensive approach ensured that all Americans, whether they resided in a large city or on a mid-western farm, would be touched by the messages released by the committee. 89 From victory gardens to war bond drives, every American was encouraged to support the war effort and participate in it. The committee's zeal got out of hand when the agency went beyond presenting the truth in the most favorable light, and began fabricating information, such as suggesting that combat aircraft from the United States were heading to Europe when the factory had not even begun production. 90 States. 97 At the end of the Cold War in 1999, the United States Information Agency was disbanded in order to cut costs and bring public diplomacy closer to policy decisions. 98 
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The mission sets were shifted back to the Department of State, this time under the auspices of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. This merger was intended to bring "public diplomacy into play sooner" in order to develop more "persuasive" messages "to foreign audiences". 99 A year after the transition however, the Communication continued to stress the necessity to "align our actions with our words,"
and develop a synchronized approach to our strategic communications. 107 Without reinvesting in the "arsenal of persuasion," the United States and the Department of Defense will be trapped in the endless battle to mitigate the strategic impact of aviationrelated civilian casualties rather than addressing the root cause of improperly managed expectations.
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Changing Mindsets
Curing the root cause of America's shortfall in the realm of strategic communications goes well beyond the scope of this paper; however, one symptom of this shortfall could be remedied by a shift in mindset about how we approach strategic communications as they relate to aviation-related civilian casualties.
Both State Department officials and Department of Defense public affairs officers are well prepared in the event civilian casualties take place, but they lack a proactive approach. The current mindset can be compared to an ostrich's head in the sand: if it is not openly admitted, perhaps the danger will go away. It is this denial which gives 'teeth' to the strategic impact of civilian casualties. In order to mitigate the impact, four shifts in mindset must take place in: 1) the execution of airpower, 2) the perspective of scholars, 3) terminology used by airpower advocates, and 4) the United States' approach to strategic communication.
The shift in the military mindset in applying airpower while mitigating civilian casualties is well underway. Airmen are systematically utilizing complex collateral damage estimates for every target prior to employing airpower, with mitigating civilian casualties in the forefront of the decision making process. This shift must be sustained and fueled through systematic and timely communications. Senior leader communications, such as the tactical directives mentioned above, guide the manner in which Airmen approach the application of airpower. As demonstrated in the opening vignette, these communications reinforce the necessity of understanding the impact of airpower employment beyond the target set, and they speak to the circumstances when it is appropriate to "let him [the enemy] go." The intent is not to advocate for a policy of constraint, but rather a broader approach to the problem set of airpower application which leads to the understanding that it is no longer sufficient to simply find, fix, and finish a target. Instead, aircrew, JTACs, and ground commanders must consider the entire area in which the target is located and the long-term impact that any potential collateral damage may have on the strategic environment.
A similar change in perspective must take place with those who study the subject in general, and the 'causes' of civilian casualties specifically. Scholars must open the aperture and take into account the actions of Airmen to mitigate the occurrence of civilian casualties; and examine new avenues for avoiding such situations, rather than placing blame or passing judgment. Airmen have a critical role to play in facilitating this understanding, they must share and explain the chaotic environment of the battlefield in such a way scholars are able to contextualize the problem of civilian casualty mitigation.
By understanding the manner in which the military applies airpower and civilian casualty calculations, scholars can gain a broader perspective on the problem set -a perspective that may unlock new solutions to mitigating civilian casualties in the future.
Words matter. Airpower advocates must consciously evaluate the words they use to articulate the capabilities and innovations of airpower. The days of "pickle barrel bombing," "surgical strikes," and "precision bombing" must be firmly left in the past.
Airpower advocates should leave the marketing campaign to the advertising agencies and defense contractors…the airpower professional should be seen as just that,
professional. These professionals should choose their words carefully to ensure they bound the left and right limits of the capability --the worst case as well as the best case.
No service has been faulted for over-delivering capabilities. There is a delicate balance that must be achieved between espousing the need and purpose for innovative technology, and managing expectations when it comes to execution. Striving for perfection should always be part of the airpower profession; claiming achievement of such perfection is folly.
Finally, and perhaps the most challenging change in mindset, is to develop a proactive strategic communications campaign which is executed prior to applying airpower. Such a campaign should target public expectations, both foreign and domestic. It should realistically address the extent that civilian casualties can be avoided in an environment of high uncertainty and dynamism; an environment that cannot be made devoid of ambiguity and unpredictability. 
